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ABSTRACT
Pairing-based cryptography (PBC) provides novel security services, such as identity-
based encryption, attribute-based encryption and anonymous authentication. The
Miller’s Algorithm is considered one of the most important algorithms in PBC and
carries the most computation in PBC.
In this thesis, two modified Miller’s algorithms are proposed. The first proposed
algorithm introduces a right-to-left version algorithm compared to the fact that the
original Miller’s algorithm works only in the fashion of left-to-right. Furthermore,
this new algorithm introduces parallelable computation within each loop and thus
it can achieve a much higher speed. The second proposal has the advantage over
the original Miller’s algorithm not only in parallelable computation but also in resis-
tance to certain side channel attacks based on the new feature of the equilibrium of
computational complexities.
An elaborate comparison among the existing works and the proposed works is
demonstrated. It is expected that the first proposed algorithm can replace the original
Miller’s if a right-to-left input style is required and/or high speed is of importance.
The second proposed algorithm should be chosen over the original Miller’s if side
channel attack is a concern.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Pairing-based Cryptography and Its Applications
The Internet becomes increasingly important in our modern society. The Internet
technology has also progressed at a constant step to provide new and better services to
meet the demands from its users. Pairing-based cryptography (PBC) is an emerging
research area in the field of cryptography [4], which provides several new cryptographic
services over the Internet complement to conventional symmetrical and public key
cryptosystems. Some features and important facts about PBC include:
• PBC can provide several special security services, i.e., identity-based encryp-
tion, attribute-based encryption and anonymous authentication, which are not
readily available from the conventional symmetrical and public key cryptosys-
tems.
• PBC studies mathematical bilinear function that can map a very complex com-
putational problem to a relatively simple one without compromising its security
strength.
• Pairing-based cryptography technology has been recently standardized in 2013
in P1363.3 “IEEE Standard for Identity-Based Cryptographic Techniques using
Pairings” [5].
Pairing-based cryptography can provide many unique or more efficient cryptogra-
phy and security services for the Internet, compared to conventional cryptographic
technology [6]. Its important applications are introduced as follows,
• Identity-based encryption [7]: in public key encryption system, the public key
of any user is based on his own identity. PBC is able to construct new ID-
based cryptographic primitives [8] to complement the conventional public key
cryptosystems.
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• Key exchange: PBC can make a tripartite key exchange be done in one round
[9].
• Short signatures: Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signature schemes [10] of PBC
only use a half of the length of other signature schemes [5].
• Anonymous authentication: the research work [11] has shown that pairing-
based cryptography can be applied to vehicular standard Dedicated Short Range
Communication (DSRC) [12]:
– DSRC is a communication service to distribute a message from a vehicle
to all other vehicles or infrastructures to overcome the problem of the high
mobility environment [13] [14].
– The goals of DSRC are increasing road capacity [15], avoiding accidents,
providing web or entertainment services. [16]
∗ The Conditional Privacy-preserving Authentication (CPPA) technique
[17] is one kind feasible scheme for DSRC, and it’s defined by the fol-
lowing algorithms: system setup, key generation, anonymous authen-
tication, and conditional tracking. These algorithms all use pairing-
based cryptography.
Bilinear map plays a central role in pairing-based cryptography. The popular im-
plementations of bilinear map are Weil pairing [18] and Tate pairing [19]. Miller’s
Algorithm [20], which is used to compute the Weil pairing and Tate pairing, is prob-
ably the most important and most computation-intensive algorithm in pairing-based
cryptography. This thesis proposes novel research works on improvement to Miller’s
Algorithm with computational efficiency and enhanced security.
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1.2 Research Contribution
This thesis work concentrates on computational efficiency and security strength of
pairing-based cryptography. Since Miller’s Algorithm [20] is considered as the core
algorithm in pairing-based cryptography and most computational intensive, our pro-
posed work is aiming to improvement to Miller’s Algorithm [21] in terms of its com-
putational efficiency and resistance to side channel attacks. The proposed work can
be summarized as follows.
The original Miller’s Algorithm works in a manner of left to right. In this thesis
a right to left (R2L) version for Miller’s Algorithm is proposed. Moreover, the new
R2L algorithm has the feature of parallelism while the original version does not have.
When the algorithm is implemented in parallel architecture, it can be expected that
the proposed algorithm is much faster than the original Miller’s.
The second proposed work is a modified Miller’s Algorithm with enhanced security.
Compared to Miller’s Algorithm, the proposed algorithm not only makes parallel
computation possible but also has the nice property of resistance to certain side
channel attacks, i.e., simple power analysis.
The idea of using signed-digit binary number representation in Miller’s Algorithm
was first discussed in [3]. As an addition to the proposed works, an error in the
algorithm presented in [3] is found and corrected in this thesis.
1.3 The Scope and Organization of the Thesis
The organization of the rest of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, mathematical
fundamentals which contain the modular operations, groups, finite fields and elliptic
curves over a finite field are introduced. In Chapter 3, the divisors and bilinear
map are explained, which provides important theoretical and algorithmic basis for
comprehending pairing-based cryptography. In Chapter 4 of the thesis, Weil pairing
and Miller’s Algorithm are summarized. Subsequent works on Miller’s Algorithm
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are also reviewed and explained. The New Right-to-left Miller’s Algorithm and the
Modified Miller’s Algorithm with Enhanced Security are proposed in Chapter 5. In
Chapter 6, the complexities of the existing works and the proposed works are analyzed
and compared. It has been shown that the proposed algorithms have clear advantages
to the original Miller’s or its version using signed-digit binary number, in terms of
parallel-able computation and resistance to certain side channel attacks. Finally, the
conclusion and possible future work are discussed in Chapter 7.
4
2 MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
Finite field and elliptic curve are the cornerstones of pairing-based cryptography. In
this chapter, we introduce fundamental concepts, such like groups, finite fields and
their arithmetic, as well as elliptic curve defined over a finite field, and elliptic curve
point operations.
2.1 Modular Operations
2.1.1 Modular Operations (Integer)
1. x mod n means “the remainder of n dividing x” [22]. In other words, if x =
an+ b, and a, b ∈ integer as well as 0 ≤ b ≤ n− 1, then x mod n = b.
2. Inverse: If ax = 1 mod n, then a is the inverse of x mod n [22]. There are two
popular methods to solve a:
• Method 1: Try every value for a < n until xa mod n = 1.
• Method 2: Euclidean method, which is usually used to solve the inverse of
big integers, so it is recommended to use Method 1 to solve the inverse of
small integers. No matter what usage Euclidean method is, Table 2.1 just
demonstrates how Euclidean method works with the 5a mod 7 = 1.
Table 2.1: Euclidean Method to Solve Inverse
Step i b a d k Equality
0 1 0 7 1× 7 + 0× 5 = 7
1 0 1 5 1 0× 7 + 1× 5 = 5
2 1 -1 2 2 1× 7 + (−1)× 5 = 2
3 -2 3 1 (−2)× 7 + 3× 5 = 1
The followings are the explanation of Table 2.1.
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– b0 = 1, a0 = 0, b1 = 0, and a1 = 1 are fixed, as well as k0 is null;
– d0 = 7, d1 = 5 are given, then k1 is the quotient of d1 dividing d0;
– b2 = b0 − b1k1;
– a2 = a0 − a1k1;
– d2 = d0 − d1k1, d2 is also the remainder of d1 dividing d0;
– k2 is the quotient of d2 dividing d1;
– Similarly, b3 = b1 − b2k2, a3 = a1 − a2k2, d3 = d1 − d2k2, k3 is the
quotient of d3 dividing d2;
...
bi = bi−2− bi−1ki−1, ai = ai−2−ai−1ki−1, di = di−2− di−1ki−1, ki is the
quotient of di dividing di−1.
– Until di = 1 is gotten, stopping calculating and the value of ai is the
final answer. Additionally, ki is unnecessary to be computed.
– In this instance, d3 = 1, so a3 = 3 is the answer.
2.1.2 Modular Operations (Polynomial)
1. Definition: f(x) mod P (x) means “the remainder of (f(x)÷ P (x))” [22].
• It can be denoted f(x) = a(x)P (x)+b(x), where the degree of b(x) is lower
than that of P (x), then f(x) mod P (x) = b(x).
• Polynomial division: (f(x)÷ P (x)) to reap the remainder.
2. For example: x8 + 1 mod x3 + x2 + 1 = 6x2 − 3x + 5, and the quotient is
x5 − x4 + x3 − 2x2 + 3x− 4
6
2.2 Groups
2.2.1 Definition
A group is a set G together with a binary operation ∗ on G such that:
1. Binary operator ∗ is associative, i.e., for any a, b, c ∈ G,
a ∗ (b ∗ c) = (a ∗ b) ∗ c.
2. There exists an identity (or unity) element e ∈ G, i.e., for all a ∈ G,
a ∗ e = e ∗ a = a.
3. For each a ∈ G, there an inverse element a−1 ∈ G, such that
a ∗ a−1 = a−1 ∗ a = e.
2.2.2 Types of Groups
1. The operation ∗ can be like ordinary multiplication or addition:
• Multiplicative group (and the unity is e = 1, if ∗ is multiplication.)
– Usually denoted by G×.
• Additive group (and the identity is e = 0, if ∗ is addition.)
– Usually denoted by G+.
2. Infinite groups and finite groups
• Infinite group: there are infinite many elements in a group.
• Finite group: there are finite many elements in a group.
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2.2.3 The Important Concepts of Groups
The computation details of the following concepts will be exemplified in “2.3 Back-
ground Knowledge of Finite Field” . Hence, here just shows the outcomes.
1. A group G is called cyclic group if there exists a group element g such that any
other element in G can be written as gj for a certain integer j > 1.
• In this case, the group element g is called a generator of G, or a primitive
element in G.
• Example: G× = {1, 2, 3, 4} under mod-5 multiplication is a cyclic group
with a primitive element 2. Because all the other group elements can be
written as a power of 2: G× = {1, 2, 3, 4} = {24, 21, 23, 22}.
2. The order of group element a is defined as the minimal positive integer i such
that ai = the unity (or ai = 1 since the unity is 1 in this case). It is written
ord(a) = i. Clearly, a primitive element has the maximal order.
• In groupG× = {1, 2, 3, 4} under mod-5 multiplication, ord(1) = 1; ord(2) =
4; ord(3) = 4; ord(4) = 2.
• G× = {1, 2, 3, ..., p−1} under mod-p multiplication is a cyclic group, where
p is a prime.
– A primitive element in G× has the maximal order of p− 1.
– Any other possible order of an element in this group has to be a factor
of p− 1.
– For k being a factor of p − 1, there always exists an element in the
group that has order of k.
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2.3 Finite Fields
2.3.1 Definition
Finite field (or Galois field) is a set that has finitely many elements, and the result,
which is operated by addition and multiplication of any two elements, is still closed
in the same set [22].
Note that the “closed” means the result, which is computed by any two elements,
still belongs to the same set, namely, the same finite field.
In other words to explain the definition, it is a set of finite many elements where
addition and multiplication are defined [23].
• The finite field is an additive group under the addition operation.
• All the nonzero elements in a finite field form a multiplicative group under
multiplication operation.
There are several popular families in finite fields, (F is used to denote “Finite
Field”), such as Fq, F2k , F3k , and Fqk [24]. Whereas, in this thesis, it just concerns
and discusses the Fq and Fqk [25].
1. Finite field Fq, where q is a prime number:
• The set is written as: Fq = {0, 1, 2, 3, ..., q − 1}.
• The operations: mod q addition, or mod q multiplication.
2. Finite field Fqk, where q is a prime number, and k is an integer > 1:
• The set is written as: Fqk = {polynomials of degree up to k− 1 with coef-
ficients belonging to Fq = {0, 1, 2, 3, ..., q− 1}, with irreducible polynomial
f(x).}
• The operations: mod q polynomial addition; mod f(x) and mod q poly-
nomial multiplication.
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2.3.2 The Arithmetic of Finite Field
It is an easy understanding way that demonstrates the arithmetic of finite field with
some examples of specific numbers operations.
1. Finite field F5, and F5 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}:
• Mod q addition: a + b = (a + b) mod q. eg: (3 + 4) mod 5 = 2; (2 +
2) mod 5 = 4.
• Mod q multiplication: a × b = (a × b) mod q. eg: (3 × 3) mod 5 = 4;
(2× 4) mod 5 = 3.
2. Finite field F22 , and F22 = {0, 1, x, x + 1} with irreducible polynomial f(x) =
x2 + x+ 1:
• Irreducible polynomials:
– Irreducible polynomial is similar to prime number for integers, an ir-
reducible polynomial of degree n does not have a factor polynomial of
degree between 1 and n− 1.
– Table 2.2 is a list of irreducible polynomials over Z2 = {0, 1}.
Table 2.2: A List of Irreducible Polynomials over Z2 = {0, 1}
n irreducible polynomial f(x), (only one listed for each n)
2 x2 + x+ 1
3 x3 + x+ 1
4 x4 + x+ 1
5 x5 + x2 + 1
6 x6 + x+ 1
7 x7 + x+ 1
8 x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1
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• Addition: a+ b = (a+ b) mod 2. For example,
– (x+ (x+ 1)) mod 2 = (2x+ 1) mod 2 = 1
– (1 + (x+ 1)) mod 2 = (x+ 2) mod 2 = x
• Multiplication: a× b = (a× b) mod f(x) mod 2. For example,
– (x× (x+ 1)) mod f(x) mod 2 = (x2 +x) mod (x2 +x+ 1) mod 2 = 1
– ((x + 1) × (x + 1)) mod f(x) mod 2 = (x2 + 2x + 1) mod (x2 + x +
1) mod 2 = x
3. Another representation F22 , and F22 = {0x+0, 0x+1, x+0, x+1} = {00, 01, 10, 11}:
the operations of addition and multiplication are similar to the previous repre-
sentation.
2.3.3 The Order of a Finite Field Element
1. For any a 6= 0 and a ∈ Fq, the minimal positive integer j for aj = 1 is called
the order of a, denoted by ord(a).
2. ai with i = 1, 2, ..., j−1 will be calculated. Till ai = 1, then i is called the order
of a.
• Example: Find the order of all the nonzero elements in F7. Solution:
ord(1) = 1, ord(2) = 3, ord(3) = 6, ord(4) = 3, ord(5) = 6, ord(6) = 2.
3. The maximal order of an element in Fq is q − 1, and there always exists an
element in Fq such that its order is q − 1.
11
2.4 Elliptic Curve over a Finite Field
2.4.1 Definition
1. General Weierstrass equation for elliptic curves [1]:
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6 (1)
where a1, ..., a6 ∈ F, this equation is usually used in F2k or F3k .
2. An elliptic curve E over a finite field is defined by
E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b where a, b ∈ F (2)
• Basically, Equation (2) is called the short Weierstrass equation for elliptic
curves, in Fq , Fqk and q 6= 2 or 3.
• The thesis will always work on large prime fields, where the short Weier-
strass equation can cover all possible elliptic curves; thus, it will always be
used.
• The thesis only concentrates on an elliptic curve over finite fields. A finite
field has only finite many elements and a “curve defined over it should
have only finite many points.
3. What does an elliptic curve look like?
Usually, if elliptic curves are defined over finite field, they look like discrete
points sets; hence, the graphs with elliptic curves are demonstrated over R so
that they look like more smoothly.
Fig. 2.1, Fig. 2.2, Fig. 2.3 and Fig. 2.4 illustrate several different elliptic curves:
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Fig. 2.1: y2 = x3− 3x+ 2
over R. [1]
Fig. 2.2: y2 = x3 over R.
[1]
Fig. 2.3: y2 = x3 + x + 1
over R. [1] Fig. 2.4: y2 = x3− x over
R. [1]
2.4.2 Elliptic Curve Points Operation
A point P (x0, y0) on elliptic curve E means : its coordinates x0 and y0 are elements
in the field, and the coordinates x0 and y0 satisfy Equation (2) [26].
1. Elliptic curve points addition:
Let P,Q and R be three points on an elliptic curve. Points addition P +Q = R
can be defined in Fig. 2.5
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Fig. 2.5: Elliptic Curve Points Addition.
Description: connect P and Q, then extend straight line `P,Q, it will intersect
elliptic curve on another point which is called point −R, and then mirror point
−R based on x-axis, point R = P +Q is obtained.
2. Elliptic curve points doubling:
Let P,Q be two points on an elliptic curve. Points doubling P + P = 2P = Q
can be defined in Fig. 2.6
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Fig. 2.6: Elliptic Curve Points Doubling.
Description: point P is the tangent point of straight line `P,P and elliptic curve,
then extend `P,P , it will intersect elliptic curve on another point which is called
point−Q, and then mirror point−Q based on x-axis, pointQ = 2P is obtained.
2.4.3 Elliptic Curve Points Arithmetic
1. Let P1(x1, y1) and P2(x2, y2) be two points on the curve E : y
2 = x3 + ax+ b,
where a, b ∈ F [27].
• Assume P3(x3, y3) = P1(x1, y1) + P2(x2, y2) 6= O, then
 x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2
y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1
where λ = y2−y1x2−x1 , if P1 6= P2; and λ =
3x21+a
2y1
, if P1 = P2.
• For any elliptic curve, there exists the point at infinity O, defined by
P +O = P , or P + (−P ) = P − P = O, for any point P ∈ E.
– If x1 = x2 and y1 6= y2 , then P1 = P2.
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– If y1 = 0 , then 2P1 = O.
– If P1 = (x1, y1) ∈ E, then −P1 = (x1,−y1) ∈ E.
2. Scalar multiplication [28]:
• Let P be a point on curve E defined in equation (2)
• Scalar multiplication nP is defined as
nP = P + P + P + ...+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
where n is an integer; nP is also a point on the same curve E.
• The minimal positive integer a for aP = O is called the order of P .
• Scalar multiplication is extensively required in elliptic curve cryptosystems.
2.4.4 The Structure for Points on Elliptic Curve
Let E(Fq) denote the set of points on elliptic curve E defined over Fq.
1. Number of points on a curve E (the Hasse bound) [29]:
#E(Fq) = q + 1− t, |t| 6 2√q. (3)
Note that t is called the trace of Frobenius. It has been shown when q is prime,
then every value N ∈ [q + 1− 2√q, q + 1 + 2√q] can be found as a group order
#E(Fq) for some E.
2. E(Fq) can be extended to E(Fqk) : k is the embedding degree is actually a func-
tion k(q, r) of q and r, r is usually the largest order of E(Fq); thus, k is the
smallest positive integer such that r | (qk − 1) [30].
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3. The Frobenius endomorphism pi is defined as a map from E to E [31]
pi : (x, y) 7→ (xq, yq) (4)
The Frobenius endomorphism maps any point in E(Fq) to a point in E(Fq), but
the set of points fixed by pi is the group E(Fq). As a result, pi only does non-
trivially on points in E(Fq)\E(Fq), and more general representation is written
as,
pii : (x, y) 7→ (xqi , yqi) (5)
acts non-trivially on points in E(Fq)\E(Fqi).
Note that, E(Fq) is a large set, which can be called E(Fqk) where k is the
embedding degree. Namely, E(Fq) ⊂ E(Fq2) ⊂ E(Fq3) ⊂, ..., ⊂ E(Fqk−1) ⊂
E(Fqk):
• E(Fq)\E(Fq) means the set E(Fq) only excludes E(Fq).
• Likewise, E(Fq)\E(Fqi) means the set E(Fq) just excludes E(Fqi), where
1 < i < k.
2.4.5 Basics on Analytic Geometry
Let elliptic curve E be given as
E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b
And also let P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) be two points on E.
1. Let the chord line `P,Q joining P and Q be y = kx + d. Then k and d can be
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solved as
k =
y2 − y1
x2 − x1 and
d = y1 − kx1 = x2y1 − x1y2
x2 − x1
So it follows
`P,Q : y =
y2 − y1
x2 − x1 · x+
x2y1 − x1y2
x2 − x1 (6)
Since in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, the Miller’s Algorithm with the
straight lines will be calculated, which includes the parameters of coordinates
x and y; consequently, Equation (6) can be written as
`P,Q : y − y2 − y1
x2 − x1 · x−
x2y1 − x1y2
x2 − x1 (7)
2. Let the tangent line `P,P to E at point P be given as y = k
′x+ d′. Then k′ can
be solved as follows:
First find derivative of E at point P :
(y2)′x = (x
3 + ax+ b)′x
2yy′x = 3x
2 + a
It follows
k′ = y′x|P =
3x2 + a
2y
∣∣∣
(x,y)=(x1,y1)
=
3x21 + a
2y1
then
d′ = y1 − k′x1 = y1 − 3x
2
1 + a
2y1
· x1 = 2y
2
1 − 3x31 − ax1
2y1
=
−y21 + 2ax1 + 3b
2y1
Hence,
`P,P : y =
3x21 + a
2y1
· x+ −y
2
1 + 2ax1 + 3b
2y1
(8)
18
Similarly, Equation (8) has the other representation,
`P,P : y − 3x
2
1 + a
2y1
· x− −y
2
1 + 2ax1 + 3b
2y1
(9)
3. The vertical line νQ at point Q can be given as
νQ : x = x2 (10)
For the same reason, Equation (10) can be represented as
νQ : x− x2 (11)
The straight lines `P,Q, `P,P and νQ are represented by Equation (7), (9) and (11), re-
spectively; so that they are conveniently substituted in the algorithms of the following
chapters.
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3 DIVISORS AND BILINEAR MAP
3.1 Divisors
Basically, divisors have wide definitions in algebraic geometry field, but this thesis
just concentrates on the parts which are used in the understanding of cryptographic
pairing computations [32].
3.1.1 Definition
A divisor D on curve E is a convenient way to denote a multi-set of points on E,
written as the formal sum [1]
D =
∑
P∈E(F¯q)
nP (P ), where nP ∈ Z.
• The set of all divisors on E is denoted by DivFq(E) and forms a group, where
addition of divisors is natural.
• The zero divisor: it is the divisor with all nP = 0, the zero divisor 0 ∈ DivFq(E).
• If the field Fq is not specific, it can be omitted and simply written as Div(E)
to denote the group of divisors.
A divisor D on curve E denotes the multiplicities of points on E; in other words,
it can represent a kind of relationship of lines and elliptic curve; moreover, it is the
cornerstone of pairing-based algorithms.
3.1.2 The Degree and Support of D
1. The degree of a divisor D is Deg(D) =
∑
P∈E(Fq) nP ,
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2. The support of D, denoted by the set
supp(D) = {P ∈ E(Fq) : nP 6= 0}.
For instance,
Let P,Q,R, S ∈ E(Fq). Let D1 = 3(P )− 4(Q), and D2 = 4(Q) + (R)− 2(S), so
the Deg(D1) = 3 − 4 = −1, and Deg(D2) = 4 + 1 − 2 = 3. The sum D1 + D2 =
3(P ) + (R)− 2(S), and naturally Deg(D1 +D2) = Deg(D1) +Deg(D2) = 2.
The supports are supp(D1) = {P,Q}, supp(D2) = {Q,R, S}, and supp(D1+D2) =
{P,R, S}.
3.1.3 The Divisor of a Function f on E
1. The divisor of a function f on E is used to denote the intersection points (and
their multiplicities) of f and E.
• Let ordP (f) count the multiplicity of f at P , which is positive if f has a
zero at P , and negative if f has a pole at P . The divisor of a function f
is defined as
(f) =
∑
P∈E(Fq)
ordP (f)(P ).
• Notice that in all cases, Deg((`)) = 0. In fact, this is true for any function
f on E.
2. The relationship of a function f and a divisor D:
A divisor D =
∑
P nP (P ) is a divisor of a function if and only if
∑
P
nP = 0 and
∑
P
[nP ]P = O on E.
For example,
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Let f be a line that intersects E at P and Q. Then divisor (f) = (`P,Q) =
(P ) + (Q) + ([−1](P +Q))− 3(O), since
∑
P
nP = nP + nQ + n[−1](P+Q) + nO = 1 + 1 + 1− 3 = 0
∑
P
[nP ]P = P +Q+ ([−1](P +Q)) = O (Elliptic Curve Points Operation)
3. There are three scenarios that straight line f intersects curve E.
(a) In Fig. 3.1, the chord line `P,Q intersects E in P, Q and [−1](P + Q), all
with multiplicity 1, and `P,Q also intersects E with multiplicity −3 at O,
namely, `P,Q has a pole of order 3 at O. Thus, `P,Q has divisor
(`P,Q) = (P ) + (Q) + ([−1](P +Q))− 3(O). (12)
Fig. 3.1: The function (`P,Q)
(b) In Fig. 3.2, the tangent line `P,P intersects E with multiplicity 2 at P , with
multiplicity 1 at [−2]P , and again with multiplicity −3 at O, so in this
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case
(`P,P ) = 2(P ) + ([−2]P )− 3(O). (13)
Fig. 3.2: The function (`P,P )
(c) In Fig. 3.3, the vertical line νP+Q intersects E in (P +Q) and [−1](P +Q)
with multiplicity 1.
(νP+Q) = ((P +Q)) + ([−1](P +Q))− 2(O). (14)
Fig. 3.3: The function (νP+Q)
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4. Properties of divisors of the functions:
(a) (fg) = (f) + (g)
(b) (f/g) = (f)− (g)
(c) (f) = 0 if and only if f is constant.
(d) If (f) = (g), then (f/g) = 0, so f is a constant multiple of g.
3.1.4 Equivalence of Divisors
The divisors D1 and D2 can be called equivalent, written as D1 ∼ D2, D1 = D2 + (f)
for some function f . The notion of equivalence allows us to reduce divisors of any
size D into much smaller divisors.
For instance,
• Let R = P+Q on E, so the line ` joining P and Q have divisor (`) = (P )+(Q)+
(−R)−3(O), whilst the vertical line ν = x−xR has divisor (ν) = (−R)+(R)−
2(O). In addition, the quotient `/ν has divisor ( `
ν
) = (P ) + (Q)− (R)− (O).
Thus, the equation R = P+Q on E is the same as the divisor equality (R)−(O)
= (P )− (O) + (Q)− (O)− ( `
ν
). It reduces (P ) + (Q)− 2(O) to (R)− (O)
• Similarly, in order to obtain ([2]Q)−(Q) = (Q)−(O), there exists a (f) = 2(Q)−
([2]Q)− (O). This equivalence will be used in following chapters’ algorithms to
substitute DQ = (Q)− (O) with DQ = ([2]Q)− (Q), so that it is convenient to
compute DQ using [2]Q and Q, rather than Q and O.
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3.2 Bilinear Map
3.2.1 Definition
In pairing-based cryptography, bilinear map [33] plays a central role, it maps elements
of two cryptographic groups to a third group, in many literatures, it is written as
e : G1 ×G2 → GT
Usually, bilinear map defines the groups G1 in E(Fq), G2 in E(Fqk)/E(Fq), as well as
the target group GT in the multiplicative group F∗qk , so it can be called G1 and G2
are additive, whilst GT is multiplicative [34].
If points P and Q are the elements of G1 and G2, respectively. Then bilinear map
can be rewritten as
e(P,Q) : G1 ×G2 → GT
where P ∈ G1 = E(Fq), Q ∈ G2 = E(Fqk)/E(Fq), and e(P,Q) ∈ GT = F∗qk .
3.2.2 Properties
In many literatures, the properties of bilinear map are mentioned as,
• For P, P ′ ∈ G1 and Q, Q′ ∈ G2,
e(P + P ′, Q) = e(P,Q) · e(P ′, Q),
e(P,Q+Q′) = e(P,Q) · e(P,Q′).
• For scalars a, b ∈ Z,
e(P, 0) = e(0, Q) = 1,
e(−P,Q) = e(P,Q)−1 = e(P,−Q),
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e([a]P,Q) = e(P,Q)a = e(P, [a]Q),
e([a]P, [b]Q) = e(P, [b]Q)a = e([a]P,Q)b = e(P,Q)ab = e([b]P, [a]Q).
3.2.3 Solve the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem with the Prop-
erties
Bilinear map was initially found as an useful tool in cryptanalysis [35]; for instance,
it can solve the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem [36] [37]. In other words,
bilinear map can reduce the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves or hyper-
elliptic curves [18].
The Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is: Given P, [a]P, b[P ], and Q, deter-
mine whether Q = [ab]P or not [37].
Pairings make the DDH problem “easy”:
1) Compute e(P,Q) = A,
2) Compute e([a]P, [b]P ) = B,
3) Q = [ab]P if and only if A = B.
Because e([a]P, [b]P ) = e(P, P )ab = e(P, [ab]P ), if e(P, [ab]P ) = e(P,Q), then Q =
[ab]P .
3.2.4 Implementation Methods of e(P,Q)
There are two popular methods to implement e(P,Q):
• Weil pairing wr(P,Q)
• Tate pairing tr(P,Q) [38]
In this thesis, it concentrates on Weil pairing wr(P,Q) to implement bilinear map.
Additionally, Miller’s algorithm is the core algorithm to compute wr(P,Q).
Consequently, in next chapter, it will move to Weil pairing and Miller’s algorithm.
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4 AN OVERVIEW OF MILLER’S ALGORITHM
AND RELATED WORKS
4.1 Weil Pairing
The Weil pairing (over finite fields):
Let P,Q ∈ E(Fqk)[r] and let DP and DQ be degree zero divisors with disjoint supports
such that DP ∼ (P )− (O) and DQ ∼ (Q)− (O). There exist functions f and g such
that (f) = rDP and (g) = rDQ.
wr is a map:
wr : E(Fqk)[r]× E(Fqk)[r] 7→ Fqk [r],
defined as:
wr(P,Q) =
f(DQ)
g(DP )
(15)
• Note that r is the largest prime factor of #E(Fq).
• For a point P ∈ E(Fqk)[r], the function f = fr,P with divisor r(P )− r(O) plays
the major role in the Weil pairing definition.
• Likewise, for a point Q ∈ E(Fqk)[r], the function g = gr,Q has the divisor
r(Q)− r(O).
• According to Equation (15), wr(P,Q) equals to f(DQ) divides g(DP ). More-
over, f(DQ) and g(DP ) can be calculated with Miller’s Algorithm, respectively.
Consequently, this chapter just performs how calculates f(DQ) using Miller’s
Algorithm; on the other hand, under the Miller’s Algorithm, g(DP ) can use the
similar method to compute.
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4.2 Miller’s Algorithm
In this section, it is necessary to recall the knowledge of divisors and the function f .
Some important equations will be deducted:
• For any m ∈ Z and P ∈ E, it follows that there exists a function fm,P with
divisor
(fm,P ) = m(P )− ([m]P )− (m− 1)(O), (16)
– where it is noted that for m = 0, it can take f0,P = 1 with (f0,P ) the zero
divisor.
(f0,P ) = 0(P )− ([0]P )− (0− 1)(O) = 0,
– where it is noted that for m = 1, it can take f1,P = 1 with (f1,P ) the zero
divisor.
(f1,P ) = 1(P )− ([1]P )− (1− 1)(O) = 0,
– Note: (f0,P ) = (f1,P ) = zero divisor, according to “Properties of divisors
of functions: (f) = 0 if and only if f is constant”, so it is convenient to
take f0,P = f1,P = 1 for setting the initial value.
• From fm,P to fm+1,P :
– When P ∈ E[r], means r is the order of P , then following (16), fr,P has
divisor
(fr,P ) = r(P )− r(O). (17)
Furthermore,
(fm+1,P ) = (m+ 1)(P )− ([m+ 1]P )− (m)(O), (18)
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Observe that, Equation (18) subtracts Equation (16), then acquire
(fm+1,P )− (fm,P ) = (P ) + ([m]P )− ([m+ 1]P )− (O). (19)
– In Fig. 4.1, according to the functions of chord line and vertical line, it is
obtained
(`[m]P,P ) = (P ) + ([m]P ) + (−[m+ 1]P )− 3(O),
(ν[m+1]P ) = (−[m+ 1]P ) + ([m+ 1]P )− 2(O),
Thus,
(`[m]P,P/ν[m+1]P ) = (`[m]P,P )− (ν[m+1]P ) = (P ) + ([m]P )− ([m+ 1]P )− (O)
(20)
where `[m]P,P and ν[m+1]P are the chord and vertical lines used in the chord-
and-tangent addition of the point [m]P and P .
Fig. 4.1: A Function: (`[m]P,P/ν[m+1]P )
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From (19) and (20) it can be seen that (fm+1,P ) − (fm,P ) is exactly the
divisor of the function `[m]P,P/ν[m+1]P , which means fm+1,P can be built
from fm,P via
fm+1,P = fm,P × `[m]P,P
ν[m+1]P
(21)
• From fm,P to f2m,P :
– In addition, according to Properties “ (fg) = (f) + (g) ”:
(f 2m,P ) = (fm,P × fm,P ) = (fm,P ) + (fm,P ) = 2(fm,P ),
Hence, following (16)
(f 2m,P ) = 2(fm,P ) = 2m(P )− 2([m]P )− 2(m− 1)(O);
Moreover, also following (16)
(f2m,P ) = 2m(P )− ([2m]P )− (2m− 1)(O),
Observe that,
(f2m,P )− (f 2m,P ) = 2([m]P )− ([2m]P )− (O).
– Now, the functions of chord line and vertical line can be rewritten as:
(`[m]P,[m]P ) = ([m]P ) + ([m]P ) + (−[2m]P )− 3(O),
(ν[2m]P ) = (−[2m]P ) + ([2m]P )− 2(O),
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Similarly, according to (20), it is obtained
(`[m]P,[m]P/ν[2m]P ) = (`[m]P,[m]P )− (ν[2m]P ) = 2([m]P )− ([2m]P )− (O),
Therefore,
(f2m,P )− (f 2m,P ) = 2([m]P )− ([2m]P )− (O) = (`[m]P,[m]P/ν[2m]P )
At last,
f2m,P = f
2
m,P ×
`[m]P,[m]P
ν[2m]P
(22)
– Based on (22), it can be straightly jumped from fm,P to f2m,P , in compar-
ison with the naive method of progressing one-by-one in Fig. 4.2:
Fig. 4.2: Jump from fm,P to f2m,P [1]
So far, for any m, either fm+1,P , or f2m,P can be obtained quickly, Miller
observed that, then gives rise to a double-and-add style algorithm.
1. This is the Miller’s Algorithm, then an example will be given to demonstrate
how it computes.
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Algorithm 4.1 Miller’s Algorithm [2]
Input: P ∈ E(Fqk)[r], DQ ∼ (Q) − (O) with support disjoint from (fr,P ), and r =
(rn−1...r1r0)2 with rn−1 = 1.
Output: fr,P (DQ)← f.
1: R← P, f ← 1.
2: for i = n− 2 down to 0 do
3: Compute the line function `R,R.
4: R← [2]R.
5: Compute the line function νR.
6: f ← f 2 × `R,R
νR
(DQ).
7: if ri = 1, then
8: Compute the line function `R,P .
9: R← R + P.
10: Compute the line function νR.
11: f ← f × `R,P
νR
(DQ).
12: end if
13: end for
14: return f .
• Steps 3-6 of Algorithm 4.1 can be called a doubling stage, which is
different from elliptic curve points’ doubling operation.
• Steps 7-12 of Algorithm 4.1 can be called an addition stage, which is
different from elliptic curve points’ addition operation.
• The algorithm calculates r from the most significant digit to the least
significant digit (where r is a binary number of length n), namely, the
sequence of computation is from left to right.
2. The details of the computation:
Input: P, DQ, r = 29 = (11101)2
Output: f29,P (DQ)← f
Compute:
(a) P ; f1,P = 1,
(b) r3 = 1:
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i. `P,P
ii. 2P = 2× P
iii. ν2P
iv. f2,P = f
2
1,P × `P,Pν2P (DQ)
v. `2P,P
vi. 3P = 2P + P
vii. ν3P
viii. f3,P = f2,P × `2P,Pν3P (DQ)
(c) r2 = 1:
i. `3P,3P
ii. 6P = 2× 3P
iii. ν6P
iv. f6,P = f
2
3,P × `3P,3Pν6P (DQ)
v. `6P,P
vi. 7P = 6P + P
vii. ν7P
viii. f7,P = f6,P × `6P,Pν7P (DQ)
(d) r1 = 0:
i. `7P,7P
ii. 14P = 2× 7P
iii. ν14P
iv. f14,P = f
2
7,P × `7P,7Pν14P (DQ)
(e) r0 = 1:
i. `14P,14P
ii. 28P = 2× 14P
33
iii. ν28P
iv. f28,P = f
2
14,P × `14P,14Pν28P (DQ)
v. `28P,P
vi. 29P = 28P + P
vii. ν29P
viii. f29,P = f28,P × `28P,Pν29P (DQ)
(f) return f29,P
• Note:
– The steps v to viii of (e) need to be noticed, because r = 29 is the order
of point P , that means 29P = O. As a result, O = 29P = 28P + P ,
namely, 28P = −P .
– As a consequence, in step v of (e), it can be written `28P,P = `−P,P .
Based on the geometry, the chord line `−P,P is just the vertical line
νP . Fortunately, it just conveniently computes νP instead of `28P,P in
step v of (e).
– In step vi of (e), O = 29P = 28P + P ; thus, this step doesn’t need to
be computed.
– In projective plane, O is defined as O = (0 : 1 : 0), and
νO : y = 1,
in step vii of (e), ν29P = νO, so ν29P equals to constant 1.
– Finally, in step viii of (e),
f29,P = f28,P × `28P,P
ν29P
(DQ) = f28,P × νP
1
(DQ) = f28,P × νP (DQ)
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In generalization, when computes the last loop of Miller’s Algorithm, it is
able to use
νP instead of `[r−1]P,P
and
constant 1 instead of ν[r]P
to simplify the last several steps.
Hence, the last step can be written as:
fr,P = fr−1,P × `[r−1]P,P
ν[r]P
(DQ) = fr−1,P × νP
1
(DQ) = fr−1,P × νP (DQ)
Additionally, O = rP doesn’t have to be computed.
3. Now, it is time to explain how to compute `
ν
(DQ):
(a) DQ ∼ (Q) − (O), based on the concept of “Equivalence of Divisors” in
the Subsection (3.1.4) at the Page 24, ([2]Q)− (Q) ∼ (Q)− (O), so equa-
tion DQ = ([2]Q)− (Q) can be obtained. Although using this equivalence
“DQ = ([2]Q)− (Q)”, it still follows the input restriction of Miller’s Algo-
rithm (P and DQ with support disjoint from (fr,P )).
(b) Functions ` and ν can be calculated respectively, according to the Subsec-
tion (2.4.5) at the Page 17.
(c) Under the divisor theory:
`
ν
(DQ) =
`(DQ)
ν(DQ)
=
`(([2]Q)− (Q))
ν(([2]Q)− (Q))
moreover,
`(([2]Q)− (Q)) = `([2]Q)
`(Q)
; ν(([2]Q)− (Q)) = ν([2]Q)
ν(Q)
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Thus,
`
ν
(DQ) =
`([2]Q)
`(Q)
× ν(Q)
ν([2]Q)
=
`([2]Q)× ν(Q)
`(Q)× ν([2]Q) (23)
(d) At last, correspondingly substituting the x-coordinates and y-coordinates
of point [2]Q and point Q into the functions ` and ν in Equation (23), the
result of `
ν
(DQ) can be gotten.
Therefore, these steps are the details of calculating `
ν
(DQ).
4. There is another existing work, Miller’s Algorithm Using Signed Digit Number
[3]. However, its one problem makes it cannot work, and the problem will be
corrected in next chapter.
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5 PROPOSED WORKS
In this chapter, the correction of existing work “Miller’s Algorithm Using Signed Digit
Number” will be attested. Moreover, two new algorithms will be proposed: the New
Right-to-left Miller’s Algorithm and the Modified Miller’s Algorithm with Enhanced
Security. These two algorithms have different features and usages. In addition, their
examples and contributions will also be demonstrated.
5.1 The Correction of Miller’s Algorithm Using Signed Digit
Number
In every loop of Miller’s Algorithm, if ri = 0, then it just needs a doubling stage
(steps 3-6 of Algorithm 4.1); whilst, if ri = 1, then it needs a doubling stage plus
an addition stage (steps 7-12 of Algorithm 4.1), that means the total steps are steps
3-12 of Algorithm 4.1. Consequently, when ri = 1, the Algorithm needs around twice
computation steps in comparison with ri = 0 [39].
Hence, when the length of r = (rn−1...r1r0)2 is not changed, increasing the the
number of zero and decreasing the the number of nonzero, it is able to keep the number
of the doubling stages unchanged and lessen the number of the addition stages [40];
as a result, calculation will be more efficient [41].
For this motivation, Miller’s Algorithm Using Signed Digit Number substitutes
binary number system with signed digit number system, and the signed digit number
system can increase the number of zero and reduce the the number of nonzero, so it is
able to decrease the calculation steps relatively, such that it can make the computation
more efficient [42].
Nevertheless, the Algorithm 5.1 is wrong when ri = 1, it can be attested.
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Algorithm 5.1 Miller’s Algorithm Using Signed Digit Number [3]
Input: P ∈ E(Fqk)[r], DQ ∼ (Q) − (O) with support disjoint from (fr,P ), and r =
(rn−1...r1r0)2 with rn−1 = 1. Additionally, ri ∈ {1, 0, 1}.
Output: fr,P (DQ)← f.
1: R← P, f ← 1.
2: for i = n− 2 down to 0 do
3: Compute the line function `R,R.
4: R← [2]R.
5: Compute the line function νR.
6: f ← f 2 × `R,R
νR
(DQ).
7: if ri = 1, then
8: Compute the line function `R,P .
9: R← R + P.
10: Compute the line function νR.
11: f ← f × `R,P
νR
(DQ).
12: end if
13: if ri = 1, then
14: Compute the line function νR.
15: R← R− P.
16: Compute the line function `−R,P *
17: f ← f × νR
`−R,P
(DQ). *
18: end if
19: end for
20: return f .
* These two steps of this algorithm [3] are wrong when ri = 1, it will be corrected
when calculating the step of ri = 1.
Likewise, the algorithm calculates r from the most significant digit to the least
significant digit (where r is a binary number of length n), namely, the sequence of
computation is also from left to right.
1. Correct the Miller’s Algorithm Using Signed Digit Number
When ri = 1, namely, it needs to be calculated the function from fm+1,P to
fm,P :
Based on (21),
fm+1,P = fm,P × `[m]P,P
ν[m+1]P
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Acquire that,
fm,P = fm+1,P × ν[m+1]P
`[m]P,P
(24)
Therefore, when ri = 1, the corrected steps 16 and 17 should be
16: Compute the line function `R,P .
17: f ← f × νR
`R,P
(DQ).
2. It will be exemplified the correction is accurate, but the two significant steps of
the original Miller’s Algorithm Using Signed Digit Number are wrong.
• This computation follows the correction:
Input: P, DQ, r = 29 = (100101)2
Output: f29,P (DQ)← f
Compute:
(a) P ; f1,P = 1,
(b) r4 = 0:
i. `P,P
ii. 2P = 2× P
iii. ν2P
iv. f2,P = f
2
1,P × `P,Pν2P (DQ)
(c) r3 = 0:
i. `2P,2P
ii. 4P = 2× 2P
iii. ν4P
iv. f4,P = f
2
2,P × `2P,2Pν4P (DQ)
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(d) r2 = 1: these steps of (d) are different from the original Miller’s Al-
gorithm.
i. `4P,4P
ii. 8P = 2× 4P
iii. ν8P
iv. f8,P = f
2
4,P × `4P,4Pν8P (DQ)
v. ν8P
vi. 7P = 8P − P
vii. `7P,P
viii. f7,P = f8,P × ν8P`7P,P (DQ)
(e) r1 = 0:
i. `7P,7P
ii. 14P = 2× 7P
iii. ν14P
iv. f14,P = f
2
7,P × `7P,7Pν14P (DQ)
(f) r0 = 1:
i. `14P,14P
ii. 28P = 2× 14P
iii. ν28P
iv. f28,P = f
2
14,P × `14P,14Pν28P (DQ)
v. `28P,P
vi. 29P = 28P + P
vii. ν29P
viii. f29,P = f28,P × `28P,Pν29P (DQ)
(g) return f29,P
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The last steps v to viii of (f) are also able to follow the Note in the Sub-
section (4.2) at the Page 34 to calculate.
Thus, following the correction can smoothly obtain the final result.
• If the computations follow the Miller’s Algorithm Using Signed Digit Num-
ber, then the steps in (d) of the correction will be:
(d) r2 = 1:
i. `4P,4P
ii. 8P = 2× 4P
iii. ν8P
iv. f8,P = f
2
4,P × `4P,4Pν8P (DQ)
v. ν8P
vi. 7P = 8P − P
vii. `−7P,P *
viii. f7,P = f8,P × ν8P`−7P,P (DQ) *
There are two important aspects that incur the inaccuracy of the Miller’s
Algorithm Using Signed Digit Number :
– r = 29 is the order of point P , that means O = 29P = 22P + 7P ,
namely, 22P = −7P . In this way, `−7P,P could be `22P,P in step vii.
On the other hand, when it calculates the point 7P , it cannot jump to
reckon the point 22P because both Elliptic Curve points operation and
Miller’s Algorithm are accumulative computations. What is more, if
calculating `−7P,P in step vii, then the step vi (7P = 8P−P ) is useless.
Therefore, in this circumstance, reckoning `−7P,P is neither accurate
nor practical.
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– According to Equation (24)
fm,P = fm+1,P × ν[m+1]P
`[m]P,P
f7,P should equal to
f8,P × ν8P
`7P,P
(DQ)
neither
f8,P × ν8P
`−7P,P
(DQ)
nor
f8,P × ν8P
`22P,P
(DQ)
f7,P cannot be gotten using the last two representations, so the com-
putation cannot proceed to go. In other words,
f7,P = f8,P × ν8P
`7P,P
(DQ)
f7,P 6= f8,P × ν8P
`−7P,P
(DQ)
f7,P 6= f8,P × ν8P
`22P,P
(DQ)
finally, `−7P,P should be `7P,P .
Conclusively, the correction of Miller’s Algorithm Using Signed Digit Number
is accurate and works.
5.2 New Right-to-left Miller’s Algorithm
New Right-to-left Miller’s Algorithm will use two core equations:
f2m,P = f
2
m,P ×
`[m]P,[m]P
ν[2m]P
(25)
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and
fm+n,P = fm,P × fn,P × `[m]P,[n]P
ν[m+n]P
(26)
Equation (25) has been proved in the Subsection (4.2) from the Page 28 to the
Page 31. Observe that, Equation (26) just substitutes m in Equation (25) with n;
moreover, it will be attested in divisor level.
• From fm,P and fn,P to fm+n,P :
According to Equation (16),
(fm,P ) = m(P )− ([m]P )− (m− 1)(O) (27)
substituting m with n and m+ n, then
(fn,P ) = n(P )− ([n]P )− (n− 1)(O) (28)
(fm+n,P ) = (m+ n)(P )− ([m+ n]P )− (m+ n− 1)(O) (29)
Moreover,
(`[m]P,[n]P ) = ([m]P ) + ([n]P ) + (−[m+ n]P )− 3(O), (30)
(ν[m+n]P ) = (−[m+ n]P ) + ([m+ n]P )− 2(O), (31)
Therefore, in divisor level
Equation(29) = Equation(27) +Equation(28) +Equation(30)−Equation(31)
Namely,
fm+n,P = fm,P × fn,P × `[m]P,[n]P
ν[m+n]P
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The New Right-to-left Miller’s Algorithm calculates r from the least significant
digit to the most significant digit (where r is a binary number of length n), in other
words, the computational sequence is from right to left, but the existing works are
on the contrary, so the proposal proposed a new option. On the other hand, it can
compute the fr,P (DQ) more efficiently, and it will be compared with the existing
works in Chapter 6.
Algorithm 5.2 New Right-to-left Miller’s Algorithm
Input: P ∈ E(Fqk)[r], DQ ∼ (Q) − (O) with support disjoint from (fr,P ), and
r = (rn−1...r1r0)2, and ri ∈ {0, 1}.
Output: fr,P (DQ)← fα.
1: P1 ← O, fα ← f1,P = 1; P2 ← P, fβ ← f1,P = 1.
2: for i = 0 up to n− 1 do
3: if ri = 1, then
4: Compute the line functions `P1,P2 ; `P2,P2 .
5: P1 ← P1 + P2; P2 ← [2]P2.
6: Compute the line functions νP1 ; νP2 .
7: fα ← fα × fβ × `P1,P2νP1 (DQ); fβ ← f
2
β × `P2,P2νP2 (DQ).
8: else
9: Compute the line function `P2,P2 .
10: P2 ← [2]P2.
11: Compute the line function νP2 .
12: fβ ← f 2β × `P2,P2νP2 (DQ).
13: end if
14: end for
15: return fα.
1. There is a little trick to deal with the last loop:
ri ∈ {0, 1} means the first digit rn−1 must equal to 1; in addition, the final
return is fα rather than fβ. Therefore, when the Algorithm 5.2 computes the
last loop (rn−1 = 1), just doing the process to compute the value of fα is fine,
and it is unnecessary to do the process to compute the value of fβ.
In other words, let the loops be just from i = 0 up to n − 2 rather than from
i = 0 up to n − 1, and when computing the last digit (rn−1 = 1), it computes
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the steps of computing the fα and removes the steps of computing the fβ:
when rn−1 = 1,
• Compute the line function `P1,P2 .
• P1 ← P1 + P2
• Compute the line function νP1 .
• fα ← fα × fβ × `P1,P2νP1 (DQ).
Consequently, when it preforms the little trick, it is capable of saving the steps
of computing the fβ in the last loop.
2. An example of the New Right-to-left Miller’s Algorithm:
Input: P, DQ, r = 53 = (110101)2
Output: f53,P (DQ)← f
Compute:
(a) O, f1,P = 1; P, f1,P = 1.
(b) r0 = 1:
i. `O,P ; `P,P
ii. P = O + P ; 2P = 2× P
iii. νP ; ν2P
iv. f1,P = f1,P × f1,P × `O,PνP (DQ) = 1; f2,P = f 21,P ×
`P,P
ν2P
(DQ)
(c) r1 = 0:
i. `2P,2P
ii. 4P = 2× 2P
iii. ν4P
iv. f4,P = f
2
2,P × `2P,2Pν4P (DQ)
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(d) r2 = 1:
i. `P,4P ; `4P,4P
ii. 5P = P + 4P ; 8P = 2× 4P
iii. ν5P ; ν8P
iv. f5,P = f1,P × f4,P × `P,4Pν5P (DQ); f8,P = f 24,P ×
`4P,4P
ν8P
(DQ)
(e) r3 = 0:
i. `8P,8P
ii. 16P = 2× 8P
iii. ν16P
iv. f16,P = f
2
8,P × `8P,8Pν16P (DQ)
(f) r4 = 1:
i. `5P,16P ; `16P,16P
ii. 21P = 5P + 16P ; 32P = 2× 16P
iii. ν21P ; ν32P
iv. f21,P = f5,P × f16,P × `5P,16Pν21P (DQ); f32,P = f 216,P ×
`16P,16P
ν32P
(DQ)
(g) r5 = 1:
i. `21P,32P ; `32P,32P
ii. 53P = 21P + 32P ; 64P = 2× 32P
iii. ν53P ; ν64P
iv. f53,P = f21,P × f32,P × `21P,32Pν53P (DQ); f64,P = f 232,P ×
`32P,32P
ν64P
(DQ)
(h) return f53,P
Notice:
• In step (b), according to the functions of chord line and vertical line,
(`O,P ) = (P ) + (O) + (−P )− 3(O)
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(νP ) = (P ) + (−P )− 2(O)
obtain (
`O,P
νP
) = (`O,P − νP ) = zero divisor, it can be f1,P = 1.
Generally, the equation can be an universal equation,
(
`O,[m]P
ν[m]P
) = (`O,[m]P − ν[m]P ) = zero divisor, it can be 1.
because of
(`O,[m]P ) = ([m]P ) + (O) + ([−m]P )− 3(O)
(ν[m]P ) = ([m]P ) + ([−m]P )− 2(O)
Namely, when the computation needs to calculate `O,[m]P and ν[m]P , it
does not have to calculate them, and can obtain the result of
`O,[m]P
ν[m]P
= 1,
directly.
• In step (g), it can use the little trick which is mentioned at the Page 44, so
that it can save the computational steps of f64,P . Thus, the step (g) could
be:
(g) r5 = 1:
i. `21P,32P
ii. 53P = 21P + 32P
iii. ν53P
iv. f53,P = f21,P × f32,P × `21P,32Pν53P (DQ)
3. The contributions of the New Right-to-left Miller’s Algorithm:
(a) It calculates the r = (rn−1...r1r0)2 with a new sequence (from right to left).
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• This is a new option for some particular designs.
• It can make cyber attackers confused: even if they obtain every digits
of r, they may not guess the sequence of r which is not the conventional
sequence (from left to right).
Thus, the new sequence (from right to left) may be securer.
(b) When ri = 1, there is a semicolon (;) to separate two computations in every
step, that means the separated computations are independent, and their
computations can start at the same time and not influence each other.
In other words, the separated computations by a semicolon are parallel
computation.
Hence, when ri = 1, the computational time is just the maximum of dou-
bling stage and addition stage. Nevertheless, the existing works are all se-
rial computation that the computational time is the sum of doubling stage
and addition stage. Therefore, the New Right-to-left Miller’s Algorithm
speeds up and is more efficient. There will be more detailed comparison
in next chapter.
5.3 Modified Miller’s Algorithm with Enhanced Security
The aim of the modified Miller’s Algorithm is against certain side channel attack
in pairing-based cryptography (PBC), so it has to assure the complexities of two
conditions (when ri = 1 and ri = 0) are the same, so that attackers cannot analyze
out which ri equals to 1 or 0. Thus, they are not able to obtain the final value of
r. In other words, the modified Miller’s Algorithm is secure in against certain side
channel attack, i.e., simple power analysis.
The followings are the modified algorithm and its instance; additionally, the anal-
yses of the complexities will be given in next chapter.
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Algorithm 5.3 Modified Miller’s Algorithm with Enhanced Security
Input: P ∈ E(Fqk)[r], DQ ∼ (Q) − (O) with support disjoint from (fr,P ), and
r = (rn−1...r1r0)2 with rn−1 = 1, and ri ∈ {0, 1}.
Output: fr,P (DQ)← fα.
1: P1 ← P, fα ← f1,P = 1; P2 ← [2]P, fβ ← f2,P = `P,Pν[2]P (DQ).
2: for i = n− 2 down to 0 do
3: if ri = 1, then
4: Compute the line functions `P1,P2 ; `P2,P2 .
5: P1 ← P1 + P2; P2 ← [2]P2.
6: Compute the line functions νP1 ; νP2 .
7: fα ← fα × fβ × `P1,P2νP1 (DQ); fβ ← f
2
β × `P2,P2νP2 (DQ).
8: else
9: Compute the line functions `P1,P2 ; `P1,P1 .
10: P2 ← P1 + P2; P1 ← [2]P1.
11: Compute the line functions νP2 ; νP1 .
12: fβ ← fα × fβ × `P1,P2νP2 (DQ); fα ← f
2
α × `P1,P1νP1 (DQ).
13: end if
14: end for
15: return fα.
1. Algorithm 5.3 still use the following two core equations:
f2m,P = f
2
m,P ×
`[m]P,[m]P
ν[2m]P
and
fm+n,P = fm,P × fn,P × `[m]P,[n]P
ν[m+n]P
They were proved in previous sections, the first one has been proved in the
Subsection (4.2) from the Page 28 to the Page 31, and the second one has been
proved in the Subsection (5.2) from the Page 42 to the Page 44.
2. An example of the Modified Miller’s Algorithm with Enhanced Security:
Input: P, DQ, r = 53 = (110101)2
Output: f53,P (DQ)← f
Compute:
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(a) P, f1,P = 1; 2P, f2,P =
`P,P
ν[2]P
(DQ).
(b) r4 = 1:
i. `P,2P ; `2P,2P
ii. 3P = P + 2P ; 4P = 2× 2P
iii. ν3P ; ν4P
iv. f3,P = f1,P × f2,P × `P,2Pν3P (DQ); f4,P = f 22,P ×
`2P,2P
ν4P
(DQ)
(c) r3 = 0:
i. `3P,4P ; `3P,3P
ii. 7P = 3P + 4P ; 6P = 2× 3P
iii. ν7P ; ν6P
iv. f7,P = f3,P × f4,P × `3P,4Pν7P (DQ); f6,P = f 23,P ×
`3P,3P
ν6P
(DQ)
(d) r2 = 1:
i. `7P,6P ; `7P,7P
ii. 13P = 7P + 6P ; 14P = 2× 7P
iii. ν13P ; ν14P
iv. f13,P = f7,P × f6,P × `7P,6Pν13P (DQ); f14,P = f 27,P ×
`7P,7P
ν14P
(DQ)
(e) r1 = 0:
i. `13P,14P ; `13P,13P
ii. 27P = 13P + 14P ; 26P = 2× 13P
iii. ν27P ; ν26P
iv. f27,P = f13,P × f14,P × `13P,14Pν27P (DQ); f26,P = f 213,P ×
`13P,13P
ν26P
(DQ)
(f) r0 = 1:
i. `27P,26P ; `27P,27P
ii. 53P = 27P + 26P ; 54P = 2× 27P
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iii. ν53P ; ν54P
iv. f53,P = f27,P × f26,P × `27P,26Pν53P (DQ); f54,P = f 227,P ×
`27P,27P
ν54P
(DQ)
(g) return f53,P
3. The contributions of the Modified Miller’s Algorithm with Enhanced Security:
(a) As aforementioned, it is against certain side channel attack, i.e., simple
power analysis because the computational complexities of two different
conditions are equal; namely, no matter when ri = 1 or ri = 0, the compu-
tations are balance, so that the value of r cannot be analyzed out. Thus,
this proposed algorithm can be against certain side channel attack.
(b) The computational efficiency are not reduced in comparison with the ex-
isting works, even more efficient because of the parallel computation.
In every loop, there is a semicolon (;) to separate two computations in
every step, that means the separated computations are independent, and
their computations can start at the same time and not impact mutually.
In other words, the separated computations by a semicolon are parallel
computation.
Consequently, the computational time is just the maximum of doubling
stage and addition stage. However, the existing works are serial compu-
tation which the computational time is the sum of doubling stage and
addition stage. Therefore, the Modified Miller’s Algorithm with Enhanced
Security is not only more efficient than the existing works but also has the
nice property of resistance to certain side channel attacks.
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6 COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS AND COMPARI-
SON
In this chapter, the comparison amongst the two existing works and the two pro-
posed works will be demonstrated. Additionally, it will analyze the complexities in
computational cost level. Namely,
• M : represents the computational cost of a multiplication;
• S: represents the computational cost of a squaring;
• I: represents the computational cost of an inversion.
The analyses ignore the computational cost of addition (A) because it is trivial in
comparison with any of M , S and I. What’s more, the computational cost I  20M
over Fq and Fqk , and “the multiplication to inversion ratio is commonly reported to
be 80 : 1 or higher” [1].
6.1 Computational Complexity Analysis
6.1.1 Complexity Analysis of Points Operation over Elliptic Curve
In the Section (2.4.3) at the Page 15:
Let P1(x1, y1) and P2(x2, y2) be two points on the curve E : y
2 = x3 + ax + b,
where a, b ∈ F.
* Assume P3(x3, y3) = P1(x1, y1) + P2(x2, y2) 6= O, then
 x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2
y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1
where λ = y2−y1x2−x1 , if P1 6= P2; and λ =
3x21+a
2y1
, if P1 = P2.
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Observably,
• Points doubling costs: 2M + 2S + I
• Points addition costs: 2M + S + I
6.1.2 Complexity Analysis of Straight Lines
In the Section (2.4.5) at the Page 17:
Let elliptic curve E be given as E : y2 = x3 + ax + b, and also let P = (x1, y1)
and Q = (x2, y2) be two points on E.
• Chord line,
`P,Q : y − y2 − y1
x2 − x1 · x−
x2y1 − x1y2
x2 − x1
• Tangent line,
`P,P : y − 3x
2
1 + a
2y1
· x− −y
2
1 + 2ax1 + 3b
2y1
• Vertical line,
νQ : x− x2
Note:
It just considers the costs which are caused by x1, y1 and x2, y2, excluding the
unknown coordinates x, y.
In the existing works and the proposed works, the steps of computing lines just
calculate out the line FUNCTIONS; namely, they obtain the representations of x, y,
and x, y do not need to be calculated. On the other hand, after it completes the steps
of computing lines, substituting the values of x, y into the line functions are other
steps, and at that time x just multiplies a constant. Therefore, the costs which are
caused by x, y are ignored.
According to the straight line equations,
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• Chord line costs: 2M + 2I
• Tangent line costs: 2S + 2I
• Vertical line costs: null
6.1.3 Complexity Analysis of `
ν
(DQ)
In the point (3) of the Section (4.2) at the Page 35:
Based on
`
ν
(DQ) =
`([2]Q)
`(Q)
× ν(Q)
ν([2]Q)
=
`([2]Q)× ν(Q)
`(Q)× ν([2]Q)
It can be observed that both chord line and tangent line have the same cost: 2M + I.
6.1.4 Complexity Analysis of the Existing Works and the Proposed Works
In this subsection, it will analyze the complexity of each step when ri = 0, ri = 1,
and ri = 1, respectively. In addition, they are all based on each computable step of
every algorithm and the previous complexity analyses.
1. Miller’s Algorithm: Table 6.1 analyzes the computational costs of every step
when ri = 0 and when ri = 1.
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Table 6.1: Complexity Analysis of Miller’s Algorithm
Step ri = 0 ri = 1
3: 2S + 2I 2S + 2I
4: 2M + 2S + I 2M + 2S + I
5: null null
6: 3M + S + I 3M + S + I
8: 2M + 2I
9: 2M + S + I
10: null
11: 3M + I
Total: 5M + 5S + 4I 12M + 6S + 8I
Therefore,
• when ri = 0, the totally computational cost is 5M + 5S + 4I;
• when ri = 1, the totally computational cost is 12M + 6S + 8I.
2. Miller’s Algorithm Using Signed Digit Number: Table 6.2 presents the
computational costs of every step and the total when ri = 0, ri = 1, and ri = 1,
respectively.
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Table 6.2: Complexity Analysis of Miller’s Algorithm Using Signed Digit Number
Step ri = 0 ri = 1 ri = 1
3: 2S + 2I 2S + 2I 2S + 2I
4: 2M + 2S + I 2M + 2S + I 2M + 2S + I
5: null null null
6: 3M + S + I 3M + S + I 3M + S + I
8 (14): 2M + 2I null
9 (15): 2M + S + I 2M + S + I
10 (16): null 2M + 2I
11 (17): 3M + I 3M + I
Total: 5M + 5S + 4I 12M + 6S + 8I 12M + 6S + 8I
Thus,
• when ri = 0, the totally computational cost is 5M + 5S + 4I;
• when ri = 1, the totally computational cost is 12M + 6S + 8I;
• when ri = 1, the totally computational cost is 12M + 6S + 8I.
3. New Right-to-left Miller’s Algorithm: In Table 6.3, the computational
costs of every step and the total are presented when ri = 0 and when ri = 1, as
well as the parts of parallel computation.
Table 6.3: Complexity Analysis of New Right-to-left Miller’s Algorithm
Step ri = 0 Step ri = 1
9: 2S + 2I 4: 2M + 2I 2S + 2I
10: 2M + 2S + I 5: 2M + S + I 2M + 2S + I
11: null 6: null null
12: 3M + S + I 7: 4M + I 3M + S + I
Total: 5M + 5S + 4I Total: 8M + S + 4I 5M + 5S + 4I
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Hence,
• when ri = 0, the totally computational cost is 5M + 5S + 4I;
• when ri = 1, the totally computational cost is (8M + S + 4I) + (5M +
5S + 4I) = 13M + 6S + 8I.
4. Modified Miller’s Algorithm with Enhanced Security: In Table 6.4, the
computational costs of every step and the total are analyzed when ri = 0 and
when ri = 1, as well as the parts of parallel computation.
Table 6.4: Complexity Analysis of Modified Miller’s Algorithm with Enhanced Secu-
rity
Step ri = 0 Step ri = 1
9: 2M + 2I 2S + 2I 4: 2M + 2I 2S + 2I
10: 2M + S + I 2M + 2S + I 5: 2M + S + I 2M + 2S + I
11: null null 6: null null
12: 4M + I 3M + S + I 7: 4M + I 3M + S + I
Total: 8M + S + 4I 5M + 5S + 4I Total: 8M + S + 4I 5M + 5S + 4I
Consequently,
• when ri = 0, the totally computational cost is (8M + S + 4I) + (5M +
5S + 4I) = 13M + 6S + 8I.
• Similarly, when ri = 1, the totally computational cost is 13M + 6S + 8I.
6.2 Computational Complexity Comparison
Here uses the following names to represent the existing works and the proposed works
for abbreviation.
• Original MA: Miller’s Algorithm [2],
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• MA using SD: Miller’s Algorithm Using Signed Digit Number [3],
• New R2L MA: New Right-to-left Miller’s Algorithm,
• Modified MA: Modified Miller’s Algorithm with Enhanced Security
1. Complexity analysis for proposed and existing works when ri = 0 are analyzed
and compared in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Complexity Analysis when ri = 0
Algorithms Original MA MA using SD New R2L MA Modified MA
Total Cost 5M + 5S + 4I 5M + 5S + 4I 5M + 5S + 4I 13M + 6S + 8I
2. When ri = 1, because only Miller’s Algorithm Using Signed Digit Number has
the condition of ri = 1, and the complexity of ri = 1 equals to that of ri = 1,
so Table 6.6 just lists the computational complexities when ri = 1.
Table 6.6: Complexity Analysis when ri = 1
Algorithms Original MA MA using SD New R2L MA Modified MA
Total Cost 12M + 6S + 8I 12M + 6S + 8I 13M + 6S + 8I 13M + 6S + 8I
3. Let r be a binary number of length n.
• Normally, in an n-bit binary number: the number of 0 is n
2
, and the number
of 1 is also n
2
.
• Usually, if we convert an n-bit binary number to a signed digit number,
then the signed digit number will be (n + 1)-bit: and the number of 0 is
2(n+1)
3
, and the total number of 1 and 1 is (n+1)
3
[40].
Based on the four algorithms, the number of loops of every algorithm is listed
in Table 6.7:
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Table 6.7: Comparison: the Number of Loops
Name Original MA MA using SD New R2L MA Modified MA
# of Loop n− 1 n n n− 1
Hence, based on Table 6.5, Table 6.6 and Table 6.7, the computational com-
plexity comparison is obtained in Table 6.8:
Table 6.8: Computational Complexity Comparison
Name Total Cost
Original MA (8.5n− 8.5)M + (5.5n− 5.5)S + (6n− 6)I
MA using SD (7.3n)M + (5.3n)S + (5.3n)I
New R2L MA (9n)M + (5.5n)S + (6n)I
Modified MA (13n− 13)M + (6n− 6)S + (8n− 8)I
Therefore, Miller’s Algorithm Using Signed Digit Number [3] is the best in
computational complexity comparison.
6.3 Space-time Diagrams of the Existing Works and the Pro-
posed Works
6.3.1 Space-time Diagram of the Existing Works
When either one of the existing works completes one loop, it will need the doubling
stage (step 3 to step 6) plus the addition stage (step 8 to step 11); thus, the time per
loop is the sum of doubling stage time and addition stage time, and this situation
could be called serial computation. The details can be illustrated in Fig. 6.1:
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Miller's Algorithm 
 Miller's Algorithm Using Signed Digit Number 
Time 
Time 
Loop 
Starts 
Loop 
Ends 
3 4 
9 8 10 11 
6 5 
Doubling Stage 
Addition Stage 
Loop 
Starts 
Loop 
Ends 
3 4 
9 8 10 11 
6 5 
Doubling Stage 
Addition Stage 
Space 
Space 
ri=1 
ri=0 
15 14 16 17 
Addition Stage 
ri=0 
ri=1 
ri= -1 
Fig. 6.1: Space-time Diagram of the Existing Works
6.3.2 Space-time Diagram of the Proposed Works
On the other hand, when either one of the proposed works completes one loop, the
addition stage (step 4a to step 7a) and the doubling stage (step 4b to step 7b) can start
simultaneously and approximately finish at the same time. In other words, the two
stages are independent mutually, and cannot influence each other, and this situation
could be called parallel computation. The details can be illustrated in Fig. 6.2.
As a result, the computational time is the worse case of doubling stage time
and addition stage time. According to the complexity analyses, the addition stage
complexity 8M +S + 4I ≈ the doubling stage complexity 5M + 5S + 4I, that means
the computational time of the two stages are approximately equated, so the time per
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loop can be either one of the doubling stage time and the addition stage time.
New Right-to-left Miller's Algorithm 
 Modified Miller's Algorithm with Enhanced Security 
Time 
Time 
Loop 
Starts 
Loop 
Ends 
4a 5a 
5b 4b 6b 7b 
7a 6a 
Doubling Stage 
Addition Stage 
Loop 
Starts 
Loop 
Ends 
4a 5a 
5b 4b 6b 7b 
7a 6a 
Doubling Stage 
Addition Stage 
Space 
Space 
9a 10a 
10b 9b 11b 12b 
12a 11a 
Doubling Stage 
Addition Stage 
ri=1 
ri=0 
10 9 11 12 
Doubling Stage 
ri=1 
ri=0 
Fig. 6.2: Space-time Diagram of the Proposed Works
Note: Each of steps 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12 can be split into two parallel
sub-steps:
For clearly showing the different parts of step 4 to step 12, the diagram uses the
4a to 12a to represent the addition stage, and the 4b to 12b to represent the doubling
stage.
In the proposed works, the semicolon (;) separates the “Series ‘a’ steps” and the
“Series ‘b’ steps” . For instance,
4: Compute the line functions (4a:) `P1,P2 ; (4b:) `P2,P2 in parallel.
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5: (5a:) P1 ← P1 + P2; (5b:) P2 ← [2]P2 in parallel.
6: Compute the line functions (6a:) νP1 ; (6b:) νP2 in parallel.
7: (7a:) fα ← fα × fβ × `P1,P2νP1 (DQ); (7b:) fβ ← f
2
β × `P2,P2νP2 (DQ) in parallel.
6.4 Performance Comparison
A comparison of the proposed algorithms and the existing works is shown in Table
6.9. Note that TA and TD denote the time delay for addition stage and doubling
stage, respectively.
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The comparison results shown in Table 6.9 can be explained as follows.
1. The proposed works contain parallelable computation steps, while the existing
works are serial computation. As a consequence, assumed parallel implementa-
tion for the proposed works, then it can realize high speed computation of Weil
pairing.
2. Where r is a binary number of length n, according to the security level, the
value of n is from 224 to 512.
3. The loop delay of the proposed works is less than that of the existing works.
4. The latency of the proposed works is less than that of the existing works.
5. The difference of the two proposed works:
• In the aspect of input style, New Right-to-left Miller’s Algorithm proposes
the Right-to-Left, which is a new option for design;
• Although the latency of New Right-to-left Miller’s Algorithm is more a
TA than that of Modified Miller’s Algorithm with Enhanced Security, the
(n− 1)TA is very big, so it can be deemed the latency of the two proposed
works are approximately equal;
• In New Right-to-left Miller’s Algorithm, only when ri = 1, it uses the
parallel computation; on the contrary, in Modified Miller’s Algorithm with
Enhanced Security, no matter when ri = 1 or ri = 0, they both use the
parallel computation, so that the fourth algorithm needs more space to
implement.
Conclusively, the proposed works are superior to the existing works; in addition,
comparing with the two proposed works, they have individual and irreplaceable ad-
vantage.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Research Contributions and Applications
After the first chapter on introduction, the thesis provides the mathematical prelimi-
naries of the pairing-based cryptography, including finite fields, elliptic curve, and the
important concepts of divisors and bilinear map, followed by an overview of existing
works on Miller’s Algorithm. Then the two modified versions of Miller’s Algorithm
are proposed. An elaborate comparison between the proposed works and existing
works in complexity and performance is also presented.
The research contributions presented in this thesis include the followings,
• Two new algorithms for computing bilinear map are presented. The first one is
the New Right-to-left Miller’s Algorithm and the second is called the Modified
Miller’s Algorithm with Enhanced Security.
• It is clear that the first proposed algorithm works when the input r is fed into
system in right-to-left fashion while the original Miller’s takes input only in
left-to-right style.
• Both the proposed algorithms possess parallelism within each loop and thus
make it possible for parallel and high speed computation, compared to the
original Miller’s. Elaborated analytical results show that the improvement in
speed could be close to 100 percent if parallel implementation is ensured.
• The second proposed algorithm has the property of resistance to certain side
channel attacks, i.e., simple power analysis, which makes it a better choice
for computing bilinear map when there exists potential threat of side channel
attacks.
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7.2 Possible Future Works
Based on the research works proposed in this thesis, the following research directions
may be worthy of further investigation:
• Hardware implementation, i.e., FPGA implementation, of the proposed algo-
rithms for computing bilinear map, which can maximally take advantage of
parallelism in the algorithms and their computational efficiency.
• It is expected that the proposed algorithms can be easily extended for compu-
tation of Tate pairing.
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